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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Municipal Corporations-Sunday Closing Ordinances-
Reasonableness of Classification
Defendant, operator of a curb market in the City of High Point, kept
his place of business open on Sunday, July 26, 1953, selling tomatoes,
peaches, and toilet paper. He was found guilty of violating an ordinance
of the City of High Point which made it unlawful for a place of business
to open on Sunday for selling or offering for sale goods, wares, mer-
chandise or services, but which excepted particular kinds of businesses
furnishing certain enumerated articles of merchandise.'
On appeal, defendant contended that the basis of classification in the
ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory in that the
businesses permitted to remain open on Sunday sold certain articles of
merchandise similar to those which he sold and were therefore his com-
petitors. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Towery,2
held that defendant was in error in attempting to make competition
between classes the test, rather than discrimination within a class, and
that he had shown "no arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police
power in the classification and selection of businesses to be closed on
Sunday."'
The ordinance challenged in the Towery case is a common type of
Sunday closing ordinance, containing a provision stating generally that
all businesses will close on Sunday, with a second provision exempting
certain types of businesses from the operation of the first. A necessary
element of ordinances of this type is the classification of businesses, and
such ordinances have been attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that the classification applied was arbitrary and unreasonable, or that
it was discriminatory. 4  To be a valid classification, all those similarly
I Section 17.32 of The Code of the City of High Point, as amended June 17,
1952, which reads in part: "It shall be unlawful for any place of business to remain
open for the purpose of selling or offering for sale goods, wares, merchandise or
services between the hours of midnight Saturday and midnight Sunday, except as
follows: hotels; boarding houses; restaurants; cafes, delicatessen and sandwich
shops furnishing meals and selling bread, cooked or prepared meats incidental to
the operation of such business; filling stations furnishing petroleum products and
automobile accessories; garages furnishing repair work or storage; ice cream or
confectionary stores, furnishing ice cream, cigars, tobacco, nuts and soft drinks
only; cigar stands and newsstands furnishing cigars, tobacco, candies, nuts, news-
papers, magazines and soft drinks only; drug stores furnishing medical or surgical
supplies, cigars, tobacco, ice cream, candies, nuts, soft drinks, newspapers and
magazines; ice dealers, for the manufacture and sale of ice; dairies, for the manu-
facture and sale of dairy products; bakeries, for the manufacture, sale and delivery
of bakery products. . . ." Quoted in State v. Towery, 239 N. C. 274, 275, 79 S. E.
2d 513, 514 (1954).
2239 N. C. 274, 79 S. E. 2d 513 (1954).
Id. at 278, 79 S. E. 2d at 516.
'In addition to this type of Sunday closing ordinance, two other types have
been challenged on the ground of arbitrary and unreasonable classification: (1)
Where there is a general provision that all businesses must close on Sunday and a
second provision exempting the sale of certain articles from the operation of the
first; (2) Where there is no general closing provision and the ordinance requires
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situated must receive equal treatment, and the classification must not
be arbitrary or unreasonable.5 It is not necessary, however, that it be
made with "abstract symmetry" or with "mathematical nicety." 6 Classi-
fication in Sunday ordinances will generally be upheld if it rests upon
any reasonable basis, and if it has any reasonable relation to the public
health, morals, safety, or general welfare.7
Ordinances requiring businesses in general to close on Sunday, but
exempting certain enumerated kinds of businesses, have generally been
held to be reasonable and not arbitrary, 8 and a reasonable basis for a
distinction between businesses is usually found.9 In State v. Medlin,'0
an ordinance exempting drug stores for the sale of drugs all day on
Sunday, and 'during certain specified hours on Sunday for the sale of
"mineral waters, soft drinks, cigars and tobacco only," was held by the
North Carolina court to be reasonable on the ground that since drug
stores were open for the sale of drugs and medicines all day on Sunday,
as a matter of necessity, they could be permitted to sell, during the speci-
fied hours, articles of common use which are to many persons "quasi-
necessities."'" Some courts have held, however, that such distinctions
only a particular type of business to close. See Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53,
140 P. 2d 939 (1943).
City of Springfield v. Smith, 332 Mo. 1129, 19 S. W. 2d 1 (1929) ; State v.
Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949); 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
COR'RATIOS § 24.192 (3rd ed., 1949).
People v. Friedman, 302 N. Y. 75, 96 N. E. 2d 184 (1950).
State v. McGee, 237 N. C. 633, 75 S. E. 2d 783 (1953).
"Lane v. McFadyen, - Ala. _ 66 So. 2d 83 (1953) ; Richman v. Board of
Commissioners of City of Newark, 122 N. J. L. 180, 4 A. 2d 501 (1939) ; People
v. Friedman, 302 N. Y. 75, 96 N. E. 2d 184 (1950) ; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318,
71 Pac. 482 (1903) ; State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 69 Pac. 372 (1902).
I In Ex parte Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 170 Pac. 823 (1918), an ordinance requir-
ing businesses to close on Sunday, excepting (among others) bakeries, livery
stables, drug stores, confectioneries, ice cream parlors and garages, was held not
to be discriminatory, since in the case of the businesses excepted it was the cus-
tom to keep them open, as well as to some extent necessary to do so, since persons
might need something from these businesses which they could not prepare for on
Saturday nor wait for until Monday.
In Lane v. McFadyen, - Ala. -, -, 66 So. 2d 83, 88 (1953), a statute
prohibiting a "merchant or shopkeeper" from keeping open on Sunday, druggists
excepted, was found to be a reasonable classification and not clearly arbitrary, the
court stating that "in order to have a place where drugs might be obtained on
Sunday, a bona fide druggist should be permitted to dispose of those articles usually
and customarily sold in drug stores other than drugs." For discussion of this
statute, see Comment, 5 ALA. L. Rzv. 349 (1953).10 170 N. C. 682, 86 S. E. 597 (1915).
'I It was further stated that it is not unreasonable to forbid other businesses
to open even during the specified hours on the ground that "people might there con-
gregate to the public scandal and to the dissatisfaction of the public, who expect a
decent, reasonable observance of Sunday." State v. Medlin, 170 N. C. 682, 684,
86 S. E. 597, 598 (1915).
A reasonable basis has generally been found for ordinances singling out a par-
ticular class of business and prohibiting its operation on Sunday. People v. Krotkie-
wicz, 286 Mich. 644, 282 N. W. 852 (1938) (sale and distribution of groceries) ;
Komen v. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9, 289 S. W. 838 (1926) (bakeries) ; State v.
Loomis, 75 Mont. 88, 242 Pac. 344 (1925) (dance halls) ; Mazzarelli v. City of
19541
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between businesses are arbitrary and unreasonable and not a valid exer-
cise of the police power.12  There must be a valid and substantial rea-
son for the law to operate only upon certain classes rather than upon
all, and it is not sufficient simply because all within a certain class are
affected in the same way. 13
Where classification in a Sunday ordinance permits a business to
remain open on Sunday and sell articles of merchandise similar to those
sold by a business prohibited from opening, is the ordinance discrimina-
tory and unconstitutional? The more recent cases have generally found
such ordinances to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 14  Such businesses
are in competition with each other, are similarly situated with respect
to the subject matter of the ordinance, and it is declared to be unrea-
sonable and arbitrary to allow sales by an exempted business and deny
that privilege to a business required to close.1r Where such ordinances
have been upheld, the courts reason that as long as all of one class are
affected equally under the ordinance, it is reasonable and not arbitrary.1"
Elizabeth, 11 N. J. Misc. Rep. 150, 164 AtI. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (butcher shop) ;
Ex parte Johnson, 77 Okla. Crim. 360, 141 P. 2d 599 (1943) (barber shop). For
citation of cases sustaining similar ordinances and also cases holding them invalid,
see 6 McQuiLLIx, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.197 (3rd ed., 1949).
" Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952) (no reason why the health,
morals, or general welfare would be better safeguarded by requiring used car
dealers to close than by allowing them to operate along with proprietors of tourist
attractions) ; City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 I1. 447, 17 N. E. 2d 52 (1938)
(no reason why the public welfare was served by closing a grocery store while a
confectionery store remained open).
" Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
In Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340 (1926), a closing ordinance was
held to grant special privileges and immunities to certain classes of citizens while
denying them to others without legal excuse, the court stating that it is not legiti-
mate discrimination to close groceries, shoe stores, and hardware stores, while
allowing jewelers, dealers in second-hand goods and tailoring establisbments to
open without restriction.
"'Deese v. City of Lodi, 21 Cal. App. 2d 631, 69 P. 2d 1005 (1937) ; Allen v.
City of Colorado Springs, 101 Colo. 498, 75 P. 2d 141 (1937) ; City of Mt. Vernon
v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 17 N. E. 2d 52 (1938) ; Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb.
537, 48 N. W. 2d 643 (1951) ; Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939
(1943).1 Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb. 537, 48 N. W. 2d 643 (1951). There an
ordinance requiring grocery stores and meat markets to close on Sunday, excepting,
among other businesses, drug stores, cigar stores, ice cream parlors, and fruit stores,
and providing that they should not sell groceries or articles ordinarily sold from
a grocery store except fresh fruits, ice, bread and milk, 'was held invalid to the
extent that it required grocery stores to close on Sunday, excluded them from
exceptions permitting similar businesses to be open for necessary purposes, and
barred them from the sale of fruits, ice, bread and milk.
A statute discriminates between persons similarly situated, which permits con-
fectionery stores to open on Sunday and sell soft drinks and confections while
grocery stores selling the same items have to close. Broadbent v. Gibson, 105
Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939 (1943).
There is no basis for the discrimination by an ordinance under which a drug
store can sell staple groceries on Sunday, while the operator of a grocery store
is prohibited from selling the same items. Allen v. City of Colorado Springs, 101
Colo. 498, 75 P. 2d 141 (1937).
16 State v. Nicholls, 77 Ore. 415, 151 Pac. 473 (1915) (defendant contended
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In the prior North Carolina case of State v. TranthamY' the court
indicated that a Sunday ordinance might be unreasonably discriminatory
if under it there was competition between a permitted and a prohibited
business in the same articles of merchandise, the permitted business
being allowed to sell them on Sunday. The court there stated, in hold-
ing that defendant could not challenge the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance' 8 similar to the one in the Towery case, that it was not made to
appear that defendant kept in stock for sale one of the enumerated
salable articles,19 and that no competitor of his had been accorded a
privilege which was denied to him. Only where there is discrimination
between those of a particular group or class who are similarly situated
with reference to the subject matter of the legislation is the ordinance
unconstitutional .
20
Under the Towery case, however, classification is declared not dis-
criminatory although articles of merchandise permitted to be sold on
Sunday by an exempted business are also sold by a business prohibited
from opening on Sunday.2 1 The court relies on State v. Medlin, where
that his cigar store, selling cigars and candy, had to close on Sunday while under
the same statute a drug storemight open and sell the same items; yet the statute
was held reasonable since it applied to all persons coming within the prohibited
class, and the businesses excepted "minister to wants more imperative") ; Richman
v. Board of Commissioners of City of Newark, 122 N. J. L. 180, 4 A. 2d 501 (1939)
(ordinance was attacked as discriminatory and unreasonable in prohibiting the
opening of grocery stores and not affecting other merchants, many of whom sold
foodstuffs not classified as groceries, but was found valid since it was general and
applied to all grocery stores in the city without exception) ; State v. Cranston, 59
Idaho 561, 85 P. 2d 682 (1938) (statute limiting exemptions to places prinmarily
established for the sale of certain necessaries or where the articles are made or
produced is not unjust discrimination, since it is not necessary to exempt all busi-
nesses where such articles night be sold).11230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949).
IS The ordinance had a general closing provision with a proviso that it did not
apply to "garages and filling stations, drug stores, cigar stores, confectionery stores,
shops, stands and bakeries which shall be allowed to operate on Sunday for the
sale of gas and oil, drugs, medicines, druggist sundries, cigars, tobacco, fruits, ice,
ice cream, confections, nuts, soda and mineral waters, bread, pies, cakes, news-
papers, periodicals, and for no other purpose." Section 199 of the Code of the City
of Asheville, as quoted in State v. Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 642, 55 S. E. 2d 198,
199 (1949).IS The defendant had sold groceries on Sunday.
"0 State v. Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949). Cf. State v. McGee,
-237 N. C. 633, 75 S. E. 2d 783 (1953), where the defendant, operator of a motion
picture theater, challenged the validity of a city ordinance permitting theaters
charging a fee to operate only during specified hours on Sunday, on the ground it
discriminated against him in that it permitted radio and television stations to
operate while he was required to be closed. The court, after stating that defendant
did not claim the ordinance discriminated against him insofar as it applied to per-
sons similarly situated and engaged in the theater business, held that the motion
picture theater was an entirely different business from a radio or television station,
and further, that no fee was charged to listen to the radio or watch a television show.
"1 It would seem there is room for argument as to whether a grocery store
should be in a different class from a drug store, in regard to articles of merchan-
dise which they both ordinarily sell. Could it not be argued that the two busi-
nesses are similarly situated with regard to those articles?
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the ordinance construed excepted drug stores for the sale of "drugs,
medicines, mineral waters, soft drinks, cigars and tobacco only," but the
ordinance in the principal case excepted drug stores furnishing enu-
merated items, not expressly limiting them to sales of such items only.
Whether a drug store could sell staple groceries on Sunday under the
ordinance the court does not decide, and it is open to question whether
the court would hold an ordinance discriminatory under such circum-
stances.
Ordinances such as the one considered in the Towery case seem to
place more significance upon the name of the business than upon what
business it in fact does. Where an ordinance excepts drug stores from
its operation, for instance, should a store still be considered a drug store
although its primary business consists of the sale of articles other than
drugs and medicines? It has been stated that at the present time "a
'drug store' could mean anything from a place where 'drugs alone are
sold to one where anything from an aspirin tablet to an automobile could
be purchased.22  It is submitted that the better Sunday closing ordi-
nance is one with a general closing provision and which does not except
particular kinds of businesses from its operation, but rather excepts only
enumerated articles or items which can be sold on Sunday.
23
CALVIN C. WALLACE
Negotiable Instruments-Defenses of Lack and Failure of
Consideration as Affected by Seal
In an action on promissory notes under seal, it was held that if the
'defendant could show a total failure of consideration, this would be a
good defense, since the presumption of consideration arising from the
seal is rebuttable.'
The origin of the seal is traceable to times when few people could
write, and accordingly identified themselves by the use of a distinctive
2' See Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5, 10 (Fla. 1952) (concurring opinion).
23 Statutes with this type of classification have generally been upheld. State v.
Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N. W. 325 (1904) ; State v. Diamond, 56 N. D. 854, 219
N. W. 831 (1928) ; People v. Zimmerman, 48 Misc. Rep. 203, 95 N. Y. Supp. 136
(Sup. Ct. 1904).
Under such a statute, it has been said that where tobacco and candy are excepted
from its operation, a large department store could open for the sale of those items,
although there is doubt whether it would be economically feasible for them to do
so. State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P. 2d 1022 (1949).
Such an ordinance has been held arbitrary in permitting the sale of a can of
beer on Sunday, while prohibiting the sale of a can of orange juice or coffee.
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464 (1948).
" Mills v. Bonin, 239 N. C. 498 (1954). The distinction between want and failure
of consideration should be noted. "Want of consideration embraces transactions
or instances where none was intended to pass, while failure of consideration im-
plies that a valuable consideration, moving from obligee to obligor, was contem-
plated." In re Killeen's Estate, 310 Pa. 182, 187, 165 At. 34, 35 (1932).
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